Reply With QuoteDa, zaista...Nijesam uočio ovaj Recordareov post do sada, ali moram reći da zaslužuje da se uokviri i negdje drži non-stop na vidno mjesto.
U relativno kratko postu sažeo je svu suštinu fenomena naklonosti diktatorima i totalitarnim režimima.
1. pobjedi Janukoviča i gušenju/osipanju protesta
2. pobjedi opozicije i prelaskom Partije regiona u opoziciju
3. federalizaciji zemlje i dugogodišnjoj nestabilnosti
4. novim građanskim sukobima, a možda i građanskom ratu
sporazumnom raspadu Ukrajine i formiranju dvije ili više novih država
nekom drugačijem epilogu-objasniću/ne mogu da procijenim
Active Member
Bravo! Stvarno nemam sto dodat!Originally Posted by Recordare88
Naravno, ali znas kako: sa diktatorima i diktaturama ti je vrlo slicna stvar kao sa lavovima ili tigrovima. Kad lava posmatras na televiziji i udaljen je hiljadama kilometara od tebe, ili kad je u zooloskom vrtu u kavezu, izgleda ti lijep, snazan, mocan...ma velicanstvena slika. Ali, kad se nadjes na 5 metara oci u oci sa njim-e onda nastaje problem.E tako je i sa diktatorima-vrlo se lako diviti Putinu iz daleka, pa sredio drzavu, pa vojska, pa blistaju Sankt Peterzburg i Moskva, pa Olimpijada pa chuda razna...Medjutim kad ti se dobro poprimakne ta ljepota, ili kad osjetis zivot u toj ljepoti, biva kuku majko spasavaj sto je ovo
Forum Resident
Da, zaista...Nijesam uočio ovaj Recordareov post do sada, ali moram reći da zaslužuje da se uokviri i negdje drži non-stop na vidno mjesto.
U relativno kratko postu sažeo je svu suštinu fenomena naklonosti diktatorima i totalitarnim režimima.
ORA ET LABORA
http://elre-montenegro.blogspot.com/
Active Member
Nisam mogao zamislit da su oni iz "novoj vlasti" TAKVI IDIJOTI!!!
VD Predsjednika Ukrajine potpisao je direktivu o ukidanju verzija sajtova drzavnih organa Ukrajine na ruskom jeziku.
Ove je klasicni primjer putting out fire with gasoline
Banned
Pa od starta rade u korist interesa Rusije.. i to. Zato su lepo sacuvali imovinu korupcijom nadojenih i to kvazi "demonstranti" u uniformama.. Koja farsa za opravdanje reakcije ...
Sminka - alibi..
Hvala Lepo
Forum Resident
Je li ko sinoc pratio intervju Lazanskog?Pricao je nekih 3 min na RTS,rekao je da nikada do sada nije vidio nekoliko desetina toliko opremljenih i obucenih ljudi u Simferopolju,i kazao je da nije siguran jos da li je vojska ili Spec-naz ruski,ali da izgledaju zastrasujuce,i da se sve obavlja potpuno normalno,saobrcaj,privreda i td kao da se nista ne dogadja
Forum Resident
Ne bih rekao da se radi o idiotima...Na bilo kojoj od strana koje vuku poteze...Mislim da i jedni i drugi jako dobro znaju šta rade i zašto rade ono što rade...Zar najbolji dokaz tome nije ponašanje ukrajinske vojske na Krimu? Pogledajte na tom primjeru koliku kontrolu političari zaista imaju i koliko se daleko spremno ići da se realizuje zamišljeni potez....Jeste li mogli zamisliti do sada da nečija vojska stoji mirno, ne bježi pred okupatorom, ali i ne puca na njega? Pa makar da jedan metak opale?...Ovaj konkretan potez sa jezikom na zvaničnim sajtovima je uostalom više u ravni simbolike, ali jeste svojevrstan doprinos opštoj piromaniji u Ukrajini...Uostalom u sukobima u kojima se kao figure za igru koriste vojske, nasilje i medijsko spinovanje, i nema potpuno nevinih...Nisam mogao zamislit da su oni iz "novoj vlasti" TAKVI IDIJOTI!!!
VD Predsjednika Ukrajine potpisao je direktivu o ukidanju verzija sajtova drzavnih organa Ukrajine na ruskom jeziku.
Ove je klasicni primjer putting out fire with gasoline
Valjda su do sada svi naučili da je Politika djelatnost u kojoj su obični ljudi samo predmet/objekt onih koji (navodno u njihovo ime) povlače poteze. Možemo eventualno govoriti o nečijoj moralnosti, no u pitanjima Politike takve analize su deplasirane...
Mene, na žalost, ovo ne iznenađuje...Naprotiv, iznenadio bi me drugačiji razvoj situacije...Ponavljam još od novembra (kad su me gledali ko čudaka, a mnogi se i pitali "đe bješe tačno ta Ukrajina?") da će stvar voditi eskalaciji, a sad sam spreman ustvrditi da (prava) kriza u Ukrajini (i u vezi s njom) zapravo još nije ni počela. Sve je ovo samo uvertira za oružani okršaj koji je moguće samo čudom izbjeći. Kako u čuda ne vjerujem, sa dubokim žaljenjem posmatram sve ovo i čekam glavni program da počne....Čak sam potpuno prekinuo pisanje na drugim (mahom domaćim) temama, jer je ono što se na domaćem terenu sada dešava ili trivijalno u odnosu na ovo i/ili je lako predvidljivo.
Da se vratim na ovo o "idiotima"...Moj je utisak da oba igrača (Zapad i Kijev) procjenjuju da Rusija ide u sukob i da je za taj sukob pripremila svoje javno mnjenje. Pripremala ga je Rusija zadnjih 7-8 godina, ali to je posebna priča. S druge strane čelnici Ukrajine i Zapada nijesu očekivali ovako oštru i nepokolebljivu poziciju Rusije, zatečeni su samovoljom i arogancijom Moskve, i sada zbunjeno konstatuju da njihovo javno mnjenje (ono u Ukrajini, a posebno ono na Zapadu) nije (još) pripremljeno za sukob, baš kao što ni oni sami nijesu bili. Okupacija Krima, iako je izazvala revolt i zgražavanje, ni u samoj Ukrajini ne vidi se kao dovoljno motivišuća za oružano suprotstavljanje Rusiji. Potezi koje u nastavku budu vukli Kijev i prijestolnice na Zapadu vjerujem da će voditi u pravcu podizanja podrške javnosti za suprotstavljanje Rusiji. Uključujući i vojnu opciju.
Da bi se to desilo (podiglo raspoloženje domaće i zapadne javnosti za otpor Rusiji) biće potrebno navući euforičnu Rusiju da produži dalje, tj., sa vojskom krene u unutrašnjost Ukrajine.
Zapad će se svakako truditi da ono što se dogodi ograniči na sukob Rusije i Ukrajine (eventualno Rusije sa Ukrajinom i Gruzijom, jer nije isključeno da bi ova druga, baš kao i muslimani Kavkaza, bavljenje Rusije u Ukrajini iskoristila da pokuša od Rusije povratiti okupirana područja), no postoje (po meni) dva elementa te igre koji jako brinu Zapad zbog mogućnosti da bude direktno uvučen ili pogođen ratnim požarom u Ukrajini:
Prvi i osnovni razlog je što će eskalacija gotovo sigurno povući uključivanje tatarsko-turske manjine u taj sukob i u nekom trenutku vrlo izvjesno oružano miješanje Turske. Turska nije Ukrajina, već članica NATO pakta od posebne strateške i svake druge važnosti za zapadni svijet. Ukoliko u sukob bude uvučena Turska, ne postoji način da Zapad ostane po strani i ignoriše tu činjenicu.
Drugi razlog koji brine Zapad (ponavljam, govorim iz ugla vlastite percepcije) jeste strah od gubitka kontrole nad radom 15 nuklearnih elektrana koje postoje i funkcionišu u Ukrajini, a čija zaštitu i izolaciju od sukoba niko više ne bi mogao garantovati.
Rekao bih da su ovo dva osnovna razloga koji brinu Zapad. Tu je svakako i uticaj na ekonomiju i probleme koje bi sukob mogao produbiti. Namjerno kažem "produbiti", obzirom da smatram da je postepeno gašenje ekonomskih veza sa Rusijom i obratno, već gotova stvar. Do toga će doći čak i u slučaju da do eskalacije nasilja i oružanog sukoba u Ukrajini i ne dođe.
I zbog onih koji se možda čude što kao razloge za uzdržanost ne pominjem nuklearno oružje...Da ponovim još jednom (jer sam to više puta napisao) opasnost od nuklearnog rata Rusije i Zapada gotovo da je i isključena. Nuklearni arsenal je tek samo faktor odvraćanja i njegova upotreba zamisliva je samo u slučaju straha jedne strane od potpunog vojnog debakla i kapitulacije zemlje. Još 1953. tokom rata u Koreji pokazalo se da je moguć, čak i realniji sukob među velikim silama (uključujući i onaj prolongirani), u kom nijedna od strana neće posegnuti za nuklearnim oružjem. Upotrebom nuklearnog oružja se može postići samo to da se prizove identična odmazda s druge strane.
Ovu temu uzgred i nijesam nazvao "sraz dva Svijeta" bez razloga...Taj naziv sam joj dao u trenutku kad su po obodu Majdana još šetali pripadnici Berkuta ko paunovi, a uključivanje Zapada i nuđenje medijacije bilo tek stvar budućnosti...Zašto? U toj riječi "sraz" (koja gotovo da i nema sinonim, a u nepotpunom objašnjenu bio bi to sudar dvije moćne fizičke sile koje jedna drugu pritiskaju i guraju iz sve snage, ali, onako, da tim pritiskom idu "kost na kost"), krije se sva žalosna simbolika ove krize i one koja će tek iz nje nastati...
Obije strane znaju koliko je visok ulog...Ukoliko se Rusiji dozvoli ovo što je pokrenula, biće to njenja inauguracija ne više kao regionalne sile, već kao globalne sile ili supersile. Neko će reći - "pa šta, i SSSR je to bio. ništa novo...". Posredno eventualni uspjeh Rusije bi i Kinu preko noći promovisao kao supersilu (jer sve što vrijedi i za Rusiju vrijedi i za Kinu), a da ova nije jedan metak iznad bilo čije glave opalila... I Kina je danas vojno-politički samo regionalna sila kao i Rusija. Poraz Zapada u Ukrajini (politički ili vojni, nebitno) bio bi početak njegovog kraja. Ne samo kao rezultat rastakanja koje bi se kao posljedica istog dogodilo iznutra, već i kao posljedica budućeg sinhorinizovanog djelovanja ove dvije sile koje bi, sasvim izvjesno, (u slučaju ruskog uspjeha, a po istom receptu) oblikovale Svijet po sopstvenom liku.
S druge strane, ponižavajuće povlačenje Rusije značilo bi kraj njenih aspiracija da zadugo opet (a možda i ikada više) utiče na svjetska zbivanja. Budući svijet oblikovali bi sporazumi (i nesporazumi) Zapada i Kine. Rusija bi u tim trgovinama tek bila sporedan igrač, sa nimalo isključenom mogućnošću da se u nekom trenutku u njoj (koja je kompleksna tvorevina) podstaknu unutrašnji antagonizmi, rasparčavanje ili čak trgovina djelovima njene teritorije.
U Ukrajini se, po mom dubokom uvjerenju, sada, a mnogo više narednih dana i mjeseci, odlučuje sudbina čitavog svijeta. Uključujući i našu balkansku zabit.
Last edited by El Re; 08-03-14 at 12:33.
ORA ET LABORA
http://elre-montenegro.blogspot.com/
Forum Resident
Ziva istina,ista situacija moze da se ponovi u Bosni,za ostale da ne pricam...
Forum Resident
Previše jednostranosti lako dovede do pogrešne slike stvarnosti, prosto - teško je i pomisliti da će Rusija ići na postizanje nekog sporazuma sa Zapadom, vjerovatno zato što je već postojao sporazum o raspuštanju Varšavskog pakta, koji je pokušao da zaključi Gorbačov, zatim sporazum o Libiji, kao i poslednji sporazum s Janukovičem, koji je važio pola sata, i još mnogi sporazumi koji služe samo kao toalet papir zapadu i NI ZA ŠTA VIŠE!
Jednostavno, malo je vjerovatno da će Rusija u skorije potezati za potpisivanjem nekog sporazuma koji drugoj strani ne vrijedi ni koliko papir na kome je napisan. Ako ništa - i svaki holivudski prikaz borbe za pravdu odiše time da: "legitimnost i pravo nije nešto što vas sljeduje - već nešto za šta se morate izboriti"
Zatim, u Egiptu su uklonili Morsija, SAD su to proglasile za vojni puč i uvele sankcije novim vlastima u Egiptu – ekonomske i vojne! A u Egiptu je vlada legitimna isto koliko i sadašnja u Ukrajini, da bi Amerikanci na Egipat primjenili sankcije, a Ukrajini dali legitimitet :stupid:. Legitimnost je u ovom slučaju uslovna, tim prije što je suština ionako u lažima i provokacijama kojima se na široko koriste visoko organizovani uživaoci zapadnih robovlasničkih postulata u svijetu.
Last edited by Xerxes; 08-03-14 at 12:30.
Zelim vam samo jedno, a to su dvije stvari: "rad, red i disciplinu".
Forum Addict
Forum Addict
A+A hvala za komplimente, a ova vijest je tacna taman kao i ona prethodna o JarosuNisam mogao zamislit da su oni iz "novoj vlasti" TAKVI IDIJOTI!!!
VD Predsjednika Ukrajine potpisao je direktivu o ukidanju verzija sajtova drzavnih organa Ukrajine na ruskom jeziku.
Ove je klasicni primjer putting out fire with gasoline
http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/ru
http://www.president.gov.ua/ru/
Obicna propaganda kao i ono za Jarosa kao i ono za "ukidanje" ruskog jezika u Ukrajini...
Deserve's got nothing to do with it.
Active Member
A da ne pričamo o Bahreinu. Saudijska Arabija kao jedan od najznačajnijih saveznika u tom regiounu NATO-a, i u svijetu uopšte, nije bila sankcionisana zato što je svrgnula jednu političku vlast i instalirala drugu, niti zato što je brutalno pobila na stotine i stotine građana Bahreina. Zato Rusija koja po pravu i zakonu ima obavezu da se miješa u stvari u Republici Krim, koja nije ispalila niti jednog metka, niti je gazila oklopnjacima ljude, treba da bude sankcionisana.
Teško ti te dvojne standarde na ovoi forum strčnjaci mogu objasniti.
Junior Moderator
Krim je sa ostatkom Ukrajine povezan sa kopnenim pojasom od svega desetak kilometara širine, i jednim mostom na sjeveroistočnom dijelu krima.
Kao što znate vijest o iskopanim rovovima na ovom pojasu je stara nekoliko dana. A danas se pojavljuju i vijesti o postavljenim minskim poljima.
Last edited by ASC; 08-03-14 at 14:16.
New Member
Tesko, jeste da ima idiota na sve 3 strane koji bi zeljeli to, ali "zvuk instrumenata" je nesto sto malo ko moze podnijeti, opet....
Mozda ce ovi sto zele "zapadnu demokratiju" kod nas /ex-yu/, i dovesti do toga...
Forum Addict
Izbori su za 3 mjeseca.
Preporucujem ti da informacije o svjetskoj politici ne skupljas iz dokumentaraca sa koje god da su televizije, vec ako te to zanima-da se dohvatis naucne i strucne literature iz te oblasti. Ja cu ti drage volje preporuciti koliko god zelis naslova iz te oblasti-naravno ne na ovoj temi, vec na nekoj drugoj ili preko privatne poruke. Opet ti kazem da je ogromna vecina stvari koje dokumentarci takvog tipa pricaju, bilo da su na CNN-u, Al Dzaziri ili nekoj ruskoj ili sjevernokorejskoj stanici ili neutemeljeno trucanje, ili namjerna hiperbolizacija nekih cinjenica. A ti vjeruj ili ne vjeruj, ali drage volje cu ti pomoci ako te to interesuje
Kad sam bio u Rusiji pricao sam ruski posto ga govorim, a ti Rusi sa kojima sam pricao (i tamo i van Rusije) uopste nesto nisu bili zainteresovani za tu geopolitiku da ti iskreno kazem-mnogo su ih vise zanimali njihovi licni, privatni problemi i kako da ih rijese.
Deserve's got nothing to do with it.
Member
Mogu mislit na šta će to da liči. Faktički u djelovima zemlje ne mogu ni da ih raspišu.
Druže ja sam fino rekao da je pričao čovjek iz Lokhid Martina, dakle tip koji je se nalazi in the belly of the beast. A ja isto nešto sumnjam da ćeš mi ti preporučit bilo kakvu literaturu, više mi to djeluje kao neka tvoja priča. Dakle ponavljam, u pitanju su javno dostupne informacije. Svaki iole veći igrač koji se bavi proizvodnjom komponenti za američke oružane snage je pod zaštitom države kako od finansijskih gubitaka, tako i za poslovanje. Uticaj koji ta industrija ima na Američku politiku, a naročito spoljnu je neosporan. Sam Američki savjetnik za odbranu je govorio protiv svih njihovih projekata i ućutkan je. Američki budžet će i narednih godina da izdvaja zilijarde za preskupe i nepotrebne projekte.Preporucujem ti da informacije o svjetskoj politici ne skupljas iz dokumentaraca sa koje god da su televizije, vec ako te to zanima-da se dohvatis naucne i strucne literature iz te oblasti. Ja cu ti drage volje preporuciti koliko god zelis naslova iz te oblasti-naravno ne na ovoj temi, vec na nekoj drugoj ili preko privatne poruke. Opet ti kazem da je ogromna vecina stvari koje dokumentarci takvog tipa pricaju, bilo da su na CNN-u, Al Dzaziri ili nekoj ruskoj ili sjevernokorejskoj stanici ili neutemeljeno trucanje, ili namjerna hiperbolizacija nekih cinjenica. A ti vjeruj ili ne vjeruj, ali drage volje cu ti pomoci ako te to interesuje
You can kill a player, but you can't kill the game
Forum Addict
Niko ne spori uticaj ali upravo pricam o tome hiperbolizovanju-to sto industrija oruzja (banke, industrija kompjutera, cokolade ili filmova) ima uticaj na kreiranje politike u USA ne znaci da je taj uticaj toliko sveobuhvatan da sad USA hoce reprizu Hladnog rata (koja je inace neostvariva sve i da je svi oce) samo zbog toga. U fudbalskom timu spic, centralni vezni, ekonom kao i trener golmana svi imaju uticaje na rezultate, ali to ne znaci da od jednog od njih iskljucivo zavisi hoce li taj tim osvojiti Ligu sampiona ili ispasti u drugu ligu. Ti si slusao dizajnera Lockheada kako prica a ja ti mogu naci 10 ljudi iz industrije oruzja koji ce demantovati sto taj prica i sta cemo onda-mexican stand off, jel? A sto se tice objektivne literature na geopoliticke teme samo posalji privatnu poruku da to zelis i daj mi 24 sata vremena i ja cu ti poslati dugacki spisak, jer nemam obicaj ni da lazem ni da dajem obecanja koja ne mogu ispuniti, pa onda ovdje posle napisi jesam li uradio kako sam rekao ili nisam. I ovim zavrsavam svaku pricu na temu teorija zavjere i vojno-industrijskog kompleksa.
Deserve's got nothing to do with it.
Member
Hladni rat je realnost moderne politike. Ne mislim da je to fenomen postojanja dvije super-sile, već je u pitanju nešto što je karakteristično za moderno doba jer najveće zemlje zbog oružja masovno uništenja više ne mogu direktno da se sukobe. Politika se nastavlja istim metodama, a to je da najveći interes pobjeđuje. A ti razmisli koji je najveći interes u Ukrajini.
You can kill a player, but you can't kill the game
Banned
Predsednik Austrije Hajnc Fišer ocenio da bi referendum na poluostrvu Krim mogao biti polazna tačka za razumne pregovore.
On je, u intervjuu austrijskom državnom radiju "Oe1", kazao da se predsednik Rusije Vladimir Putin ne može okarakterisati kao "političar koji izaziva katastrofe" i da ne može rusku vojsku poslati protiv Evrope ili Ukrajine.
Evropa bi, kako je naveo, trebalo da još "na ledu drži" sankcije protiv Moskve, i da ih primenjuje samo postepeno kao poslednje sredstvo.
Istovremeno je ocenio da treba uzeti u obzir zabrinutost Rusije i u ovom trenutku, pre svega, odustati od mogućeg članstva Ukrajine u NATO.
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index....&nav_id=821214
Forum Addict
Pa o tome ti i pricam citavo vrijeme da Zapad nema ama bash nikakvi interes da antagonizuje Rusiju. Hladni rat u obliku kakav je bio od kraja 40ih do kraja 80ih ne moze se nikako vise ponoviti i to nema nikakve veze ni sa Zapadom (samim) ni sa Rusijom (samom) vec sa ekonomskom medjuzavisnoscu svih velikih (i malih) aktera i tehnoloskim napretkom, prvenstveno u komunikacijama, koje je covjecanstvo iskusilo u prethodnih 20 godina, a takodje i sa nesrazmjernom snagom aktera u tom hipotetickom hladnom (ili toplom) ratu. A to sto ovdje neki sanjaju o gvozdenim zavjesama, nuklearnim raketama, spektakularnim duelima Falkona i Suhoja i ostalim cudima raznim, to je njihov problem
Last edited by Recordare88; 08-03-14 at 16:36.
Deserve's got nothing to do with it.
Forum Addict
Nijesu to minska polja vec zaostalo hemijsko naoruzanje od Sadama koje sad Rusi zakopaliKrim je sa ostatkom Ukrajine povezan sa kopnenim pojasom od svega desetak kilometara širine, i jednim mostom na sjeveroistočnom dijelu krima.
Kao što znate vijest o iskopanim rovovima na ovom pojasu je stara nekoliko dana. A danas se pojavljuju i vijesti o postavljenim minskim poljima.
Forum Resident
Evo sad naiđoh na ovaj intervju, pa rekoh da podijelim s vama...Mislio sam da vam ga prevedem, ali je poduži pa bi mi oduzelo vremena...Računam da će se mnogi od vas ipak snaći...
Intervju je rađen sa bivšim savjetnikom za nacionalnu bezbjednost SAD, Dr. Zbigniewom Brzezinskim koji je na tom mjestu bio od 1977. do 1981. godine, a u administraciji američkog predsjednika Jimmyja Cartera. Izuzetno je uticajan i danas, a slovi za jednog od najboljih američkih analitičara geopolitike...
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With the Crimea crisis showing no sign of winding down, TAI editor Adam Garfinkle sat down to talk with Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinkski about the broader repercussions for American foreign policy around the world.
AMG: Let’s put on and take off the table quickly the fear that this business in Ukraine is going to lead to World War III. We can both imagine pathways to such a result, but it isn’t going to happen, is it?
ZB: I don’t think so, unless—and it’s a very remote possibility—Vladimir Putin has lost his understanding of reality and has become a victim of clinical megalomania. I doubt that. The operation in Crimea seems to be cleverly constructed, with a safety valve.
AMG: And you don’t think that the Obama Administration will overreact or mis-react in some way to compensate for the perception that it has been weak in the past?
ZB: I think the more likely difficulty we’ll face is this: Putin is less likely to use military force against Ukraine if the Ukrainians are sufficiently united and determined to resist. However, if he uses force and they do resist, there is going to be a significant local conflict, which then has threatening implications for the immediate neighbors to the west of Ukraine, countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Empire. In that context, while I don’t think we can intervene directly, I think it’s certainly in our interest to provide assistance to the Ukrainians, in the sense of weaponry, aid, diplomatic support and so on. It is in the U.S. interest that the resistance be effective and the outcome not be entirely one-sided if there is a fight. In some fashion, communicating that intent, without being brazen about it, may reduce the probability, whatever that probability might be, of a further Russian attack. So we have to be more than just passive, but we mustn’t be hyperactive.
AMG: Speaking of probabilities, as you just did, the rub is that we don’t know what Putin’s motives are right now. The discussion goes from “Crimea is just a face-saving act in order to compensate for their loss of their guy in Kiev” all the way to the view that he doesn’t intend to stop at the Dnieper but intends to seize and reintegrate all of Ukraine into a Russian state. Isn’t that uncertainty part of the dilemma?
ZB: It’s hard to understand how Putin could calculate that doing what he did in Crimea would make the Ukrainians more supine toward him in Kiev. So unless it’s a sudden burst of poorly calculated activism, the Crimea operation could be the first stage of a series of steps he’s planning, perhaps to create exploitable unrest in eastern Ukraine. The aim would be to demonstrate that Ukraine is falling into anarchy, thereby making a case for a wider Russian intervention, and then we’re back to having to ask ourselves: “How do we react to make that not happen, and if it does happen, how do we make it prolonged and costly?”
AMG: Right, we need to act now to make Putin’s more expansive possible ambitions so expensive, one way or another, that we can deter them. But as you say, we mustn’t overreact. Some people are advocating mobilizing NATO, and I think that’s foolish and even dangerous.
ZB: I don’t think mobilizing NATO makes sense because, for one thing, that’s a very major undertaking. But NATO cannot sit and pretend nothing is happening. The Allies have to get together; we have to discuss contingencies. We have to consider perhaps placing some U.S. troops back in Europe since we have drawn them down to an almost zero level, and so forth. But we can only do that if we have a larger strategy and a sense of balance between deterrence and capitulation on the one hand, and deterrence and accommodation on the other hand.
AMG: I’m glad you used the word accommodation. It’s not a dirty word. Obviously, for Russia Ukraine is a vital interest. It’s right next door to them and always will be. There are at least 400 years of relevant history here. The United States is far away. In other words, while the balance of power in some objective sense may not be very uneven, the balance of interests—which is just as important most of the time—is not in our favor.
ZB: We’re so much stronger and richer, so I don’t think that the balance of power is not in our favor. But it’s not so decisively in our favor that we can simply snap our fingers and have the Russians do what we want, any more than, were the situations hypothetically reversed, they could do the same to us if there were a major crisis in Mexico. I think we are engaged in this crisis, and we have to be steady. We have to calculate more carefully but firmly what might be the escalation we might want to avoid, and what enticements could encourage the Russians to find some way in which we both settle together on an arrangement for Ukraine (as I’ve written elsewhere) somewhat like Finland. Finland is very much part of the West—politically, socially, culturally—but it has simultaneously good relations with Russia and is at the same time not a member of NATO.
AMG: The origins of that circumstance are very interesting, as you certainly know: The Russians decided to not satellitize Finland after the World War II I think for two reasons. One is that the Finns put up a damn good fight in the Winter War…
ZB: Precisely.
AMG: But the other was that Stalin worried that if the Soviets pushed Finland into satellite status, then Sweden would join the West, and that was a bad deal for the Russians.
ZB: Sweden did actually secretly do that. But it was the fact that the Finns fought very well that reinforces my point that if the Ukrainians fight well, if it comes to that, the Russians may accommodate.
AMG: Let’s shift a bit to the meta-narrative being spun by the Western chatterati on Crimea. Everybody is pulling out historical analogies. I’ve heard several so far. The most common, of course, is that this is like the Cold War, except that it isn’t really, is it? No ideological dimension remotely akin to the Cold War is present here. And then I’ve heard some say, a little glibly I have to assume, that here you have a nasty bunch holding an Olympics and then shortly thereafter invading a country—the reference being, obviously, the 1936 Munich Olympics and the ensuing Czechoslovak crisis. Then some cite a second Crimean War. But none of these analogies make much sense to me. Are there any historical analogies that are less misleading and more useful?
ZB: Well, it depends on where it ends. One analogy that comes to mind is the Munich agreement of 1938, which castrated Czechoslovakia, and the West went along with it. And then a few months later, emboldened by that, Hitler struck and occupied all of Czechoslovakia. We now know that the German general staff was prepared to rebel against him during the first phase, because they thought he was plunging them into a war that would be too expensive and perhaps not winnable. But after he staged the coup and got the Sudetenland and the West acquiesced, Hitler became emboldened and the German military decided that maybe he is right and supported him. And then, half a year later, the world plunged into war.
I don’t think that’s going to happen, because in the nuclear age total war between us and the Russians is not conceivable. But there may be an indirect conflict. And the best way to avoid that indirect conflict is to indicate right now that if there is an indirect conflict, we will have no choice but to wage it. And, again, if the Ukrainians resist particularly well, we have to make it clear to Moscow that we will have no choice but to provide some support from the outside, but not engage as direct participants.
(nastavak niže)
ORA ET LABORA
http://elre-montenegro.blogspot.com/
Forum Resident
AMG: Let’s talk for a moment about the proliferation/counterproliferation implications of what’s already happened, and what might happen in the future if the Russians try to reach further, beyond Crimea. In the Budapest Memorandum of December 5, 1994, the Ukrainians gave up the nuclear weapons left on their soil from Soviet times in return for a pledge that Moscow would respect their territorial integrity and their sovereignty. One could draw the conclusion from this that it was a bad idea for the Ukrainians to give up their nukes, because had they kept them maybe the Crimea wouldn’t be under Russian occupation today. Do you credit that argument? More important, do you see any proliferation/counterproliferation implications from all of this in how other actors around the world are likely to interpret the situation?
ZB: It’s impossible to make a rational judgment on that. Certainly, if Ukraine still had nuclear weapons, it is conceivable that the Russians might not be playing the kind of a stunt that they’re playing in Crimea.
AMG: Of course the matter has to be speculative, but do you think other countries, including the Iranians, for example, will take the lesson?
ZB: Well, that’s an interesting point. Maybe you’re right. This is another negative aspect of what Putin is doing.
What is most negative about what Putin is doing, however, is that it is not necessary. Why is he doing it? It’s not going to enhance Russia’s power, it’s not going to make it more credible. It’s not a contribution in the longer run to making Russia an attractive, increasingly—we would have hoped—democratic and successful state. I think that what is happening is, perhaps above all, a tragedy for Russia.
AMG: A colleague of ours, Slava Inozemtsev, has argued that the Russians could have had the Ukrainians eating out of their hand if they had done the right things all along—attractive things—as opposed to the wrong, bullying and aggressive things.
ZB: Yes, I think Putin’s blown it. I have a sense from casually observing his recent press conference that he’s somewhat shaken, uncertain, and groping. And I think, in that context, that there is a possibility of playing this out intelligently. But not by crawling. Nor by announcing, as some of our thinkers in international affairs have been doing, that we have no choice, that we have no influence, that there’s nothing we can do. Nor, as the British seem inclined to argue, “Well, there’s a lot of Russian money in our banks…”
AMG: On your first point here I think of Cuba, 1962. The Kennedy Administration was strong, but it left Khrushchev a way out. You can’t close off all the ways for an aggressor to back up if you want to avoid confrontation. If Putin’s made a mistake and he wants to take a step backwards, we have to keep a door or a window open so he can do that.
ZB: That’s right.
AMG: We’ll leave it at that for now; I agree with you.
So: now a question, please, about the collateral effect of what has happened on the Administration’s Middle East policies. Obviously, Secretary Kerry and, for that matter, the President, have made it clear that they are depending to one degree or another on Russia to help with the Syria portfolio and the related Iranian portfolio. And now many are saying, in effect, look, when you trust the Russians to help you out in places like that, and then they turn around and invade Crimea…. What light does that cast on the assumption that they would ever have been helpful in the first place? I have to say that I never bought the idea that the Russians were going to be useful partners with regard to Syria and Iran, and to me that now just seems more obvious than ever.
ZB: I look at it a little differently. I think the Russians have an interest in being somewhat helpful in those cases, not because they want to bail us out, but because Russia could be adversely affected if push comes to shove too broadly in the region. Ultimately, a nuclear-armed Iran might be more likely to collide with Russian interests than with ours, particularly if the Sunni-Shi’a sectarian war were to spread. Similarly with Syria: They have a residual interest, they have been present there for a long time. They may well be driven out by the Sunni side of a sectarian war, which certainly is not friendly in its attitude toward Russia.
The problem here is that the Russians might calculate that, even if that is the case, we’ll suffer more than they will, and therefore they may be tempted to let that demon out of the cage. I think they would be mistaken to take such a short-term view. Consider that of Russia’s 140 million people, Muslims make up between 25 and 30 million. That’s a lot. And they are going to be increasingly inflamed, and they are geographically close while we are far away.
And then look at the extraordinarily strong reaction by the Turks, at least verbally so far, to what is happening in Ukraine. The Foreign Minister of Turkey, who is a prominent, influential and thoughtful man, Ahmet Davutoglu, flew to Kiev and made extremely strong statements of how Turkey cannot ignore what is happening, how its security is being affected by what is happening in Crimea specifically.
AMG: This is the neo-Ottoman mindset at work; the Turks fought at least thirteen wars with Russia, depending on how you count.
ZB: Yes, and won some of them, actually!
So, if I was Russian, I would ask myself: Do I really want to create a situation in which the whole Muslim-Russian issue is ignited, as it already is in Dagestan and Ingushetia, and as it was brutally suppressed in Chechnya, which could erupt again, and so forth? So I think the Russians, assuming their leadership is not dependent on one, perhaps megalomaniacally minded leader, ought to give this some consideration.
AMG: When we think about our menu of possible responses, both kinetic ones and other ones, to the Ukraine crisis, our allies matter critically. Obviously, our European allies matter most directly in this case. And I have to say that I find the views inside the European Union right now to be somewhat opaque. I can’t figure out what the Germans, the French, the British and even the Poles are really thinking, let alone what they’re thinking together, or even if they’re thinking together beyond the superficial level of readying public statements. It’s hard to liaise effectively with allies that don’t have their own thinking straight. What’s your sense of how things are going to the west of Ukraine?
ZB: When you say the Europeans can’t get together, it’s partially true, but it’s partially not true. After all, they were together in Kiev a week or so ago. The three foreign ministers of Poland, Germany and France had negotiated an arrangement, and that means, respectively, the country nearby which is potentially affected the most, the most powerful European country which has had a troubled history with Russia, and a country which has been a major historical player in European affairs and which historically has had a good relationship with Russia. The three put together a package. Now, of course, we’ll see whether that cohesion will stand together under the circumstances of stress and threat that Putin has created. But my guess is that if Putin overdoes it, it will—although, as you suggest, individual and distinct national interests may create problems. And here, particularly, we come back to the British interest in having the City of London serve as a kind of global Las Vegas for world finances.
AMG: That’s the psychological baggage of history at work weighing everyone down, and it’s as true of Russia with regard to Ukraine as it is of China with regard to Japan.
ZB: Yes, that’s right. But the other thing, the Russian thing, is also close to the Chinese heart. It’s only been, what, 40 years, since they killed a lot of Russian border guards on Damansky Island?
AMG: One last question: Justifiably or not, there is a sense in the world that the United States is having a Greta Garbo moment, as our colleague Joe Joffe has put it—that we’re a bit tired, inwardly distracted, that we want to be alone for awhile. The concern is that revisionist powers that are dissatisfied with the status quo for one reason or another will be more inclined to act on grievances if the United States is perceived to be inadequately robust in its vigilance. Some interpret the Crimea crisis as evidence of excessive U.S. quietude, and worry that it could foreshadow cascading future crises if we do not respond vigorously. Do you credit the cascade theory of present and future trouble?
ZB: Well, I’d like to see some examples.
AMG: Some would say that the Chinese erected their recent air defense zone out of this general context.
ZB: And how did we react? We flew two bombers right through it. And ever since then, the issue’s gone.
It’s true that arguments like these are easier to make in a world that is threatening and dangerous and unstable. And it is all those things right now.
Obviously, as you suggested by your question about us possibly over-reacting to what is going on in Ukraine, one has to be cautious not to precipitate massive escalation and irrational conflict erupting at a moment when the world is very agitated. And as I have argued, we are no longer living in a hegemonic age. We are still pre-eminent, but we’re no longer hegemonic. And that does require a different pattern of conduct, not excluding the use of force if necessary, but not relying on it as a first or principal response.
ORA ET LABORA
http://elre-montenegro.blogspot.com/
Forum Addict
Ja bih rekao da je Zbignjev savjetnik Ukrajincima pa makar tajni, jer ako uporedimo izjave Julije i Jacenjuka i njegovu pricu 99.9% stvari se ne samo poklapa, nego bukvalno isto zvuce (pishu)
Deserve's got nothing to do with it.
Forum Resident
Ne vjerujem da je baš on taj koji ih savjetuje, baš kao što i ne vjerujem da od dana agresije Timošenkova i Jacenjuk uistinu samostalno povlače bilo koji potez...Bude pomalo istrčavanja, ali, lako je to uočiti, za sada slušaju Zapad šta im se kaže da čine. Svjesni su oni da ovo već danima nije primarno njihov konflikt. Ukrajina je, na žalost, samo šahovska tabla na kojoj igru igraju veliki igrači.Ja bih rekao da je Zbignjev savjetnik Ukrajincima pa makar tajni, jer ako uporedimo izjave Julije i Jacenjuka i njegovu pricu 99.9% stvari se ne samo poklapa, nego bukvalno isto zvuce (pishu)
Uzgred, kad već napravih osvrt, a u kontekstu mog posta od jutros kada sam najavio da će Zapad ići na mobilizaciju vlastite javnosti kako bi ista bila spremnija za eskalaciju konflikta, obrati pažnju na ovaj članak koji je jutros objavljen u jednom od najuglednijih političkih magazina na Svijetu, ljevičarskom londonskom "The Economist-u", inače poznatom po umjerenim i izbalansiranim tekstovima...Samo obrati pažnju na ton ovog najnovijeg teksta...Nedostaje samo poziv na oružje...
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The Economist: Mar 8th 2014 | From the print edition
Crisis in Ukraine
Kidnapped by the Kremlin
The West can punish Putin’s Russia for its belligerence in Ukraine. But only if it is prepared to pay a price
AS YOU read this, 46m people are being held hostage in Ukraine. Vladimir Putin has pulled Russian troops back from the country’s eastern border. But he has also demanded that the West keep out and that the new government in Kiev should once again look towards Russia. Don’t be alarmed, he says with unambiguous menace, invasion is a last resort.
Some in the West will argue that the starting point for policy is to recognise reality, however unpalatable. Let Mr Putin keep the Crimean peninsula, which he occupied just over a week ago. It has a Russian-speaking majority and was anyway part of Russia until 1954. As for Ukraine as a whole, Russia is bound to dominate it, because it cares more about the country than the West does. America and the European Union must of course protest, but they would do well to avoid a useless confrontation that would harm their own economies, threaten their energy supplies and might plunge Ukraine into war. Mr Putin has offered a way out and the West should grasp it.
In another world
That thinking is mistaken. In the past week Mr Putin has trampled over norms that buttress the international order and he has established dangerous precedents that go far beyond Ukraine (see article). Giving in to kidnappers is always dangerous: those who fail to take a stand to start with often face graver trials later on.
The Ukrainian citizens who protested in Maidan did not drive out a home-grown autocrat only to become beholden to the one next door; many of the youths on the streets of Donetsk and Kharkiv, in the Russian-speaking east, are as eager to belong to a sovereign Ukraine as are their compatriots in Kiev and Lviv. They know that under Russia’s sway Ukraine would be weak and dependent. They look westward to Europe, which offers their country its best hope of overcoming chronic corruption and bolstering the economy.
Crimea seems inclined to turn eastward instead; and if its people voted for an orderly secession, it might well get the backing of the outside world. But the referendum that has been announced for March 16th is being held at the point of a Kalashnikov. Moreover, the justification Mr Putin claims for sending in troops is not Crimea’s unique history, but the principle that the Kremlin has a duty to protect Russians and Russian-speakers wherever they may be—the logic that Hitler used when he seized parts of Europe in the 1930s. If the West implicitly accepts this line, Mr Putin will have a pretext for intervening to protect Russians scattered across the former Soviet Union, from Central Asia to the Baltic.
Many powers, not least Britain, France and the United States, have sometimes broken international law. But Mr Putin has emptied the law of significance, by warping reality to mean whatever he chooses. He has argued that fascists threaten the safety of Russian-speakers in Ukraine; that the elite troops surrounding Ukrainian bases are not Russian, but irregulars who bought their uniforms in the shops; that the Budapest memorandum, which Russia signed in 1994 and guarantees Ukraine’s borders, is no longer valid because the government in Kiev has been overthrown. Such preposterous claims are not meant to be taken at face value. Instead they communicate a truth that ordinary Russians understand only too well: the law is there not to restrain power, but to serve it. Unchallenged, this is a licence for Russian aggression.
So do not bet on Mr Putin being content to stop at Ukraine. In 2008 he fought Georgia to assert control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He has said that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the 20th century’s greatest geopolitical catastrophe. He is armed with a self-proclaimed mission to rebuild the Russian empire and now with a pretext to intervene abroad. Unconstrained by law or the fear that the West will stand up to him, Mr Putin would pose a grave threat to his neighbours.
You say Kiev, I say Kyiv
The West is not about to go to war over Ukraine, nor should it. Not enough of its interests are at stake to risk a nuclear conflict. But the occupation of Crimea must be punished, and Mr Putin must be discouraged from invading anywhere else.
Mr Putin expects a slap on the wrist. Sanctions must exceed his expectations. Shunning the G8 summit, which he is due to host in June, is not enough. It is time to impose visa bans and asset freezes on regime-connected Russians (the craven parliamentarians who rubber-stamped their army’s deployment should be among the first batch); to stop arms sales and cut Kremlin-friendly financial firms from the global financial system; to prepare for an embargo on Russian oil and gas, in case Ukrainian troops are slaughtered in Crimea or Russia invades eastern Ukraine. And the West should strengthen its ability to resist the Kremlin’s revanchism: Europe should reduce its dependence on Russian gas (see article); America should bin restrictions on energy exports; NATO should be invigorated.
Ukraine needs aid, not only because it is bankrupt, but also because Russia can gravely harm its economy and will want to undermine any independent-minded government. America and the EU have found some billions in emergency funds, but Ukraine also needs the prospect, however distant, of EU membership and a big IMF package along with the technical assistance to meet its conditions. A vital start is a monitored election to replace today’s interim government and the parliament, which is for sale to the highest bidder.
As things stand, mindful of their fragile economies, and with the Kremlin hinting at revenge against sanctions, many Europeans worry about the cost of all this (see article). But Mr Putin will gauge whether the West is resolute about its eastern borders partly by the price it is prepared to pay. Others argue that the West needs Russia to help deal with Syria and Iran’s nuclear programme. But Russia is fuelling the war in Syria, and it has just torn up the deal that promised Ukraine security after it surrendered its nuclear weapons—a terrible precedent. For too long Western leaders have hoped that their countries’ economic ties with Russia could be impervious to the Kremlin’s belligerence. This week Mr Putin proved them wrong.
ORA ET LABORA
http://elre-montenegro.blogspot.com/
Forum Addict
Economist nije bas ljevicarski list ali da ne cijepam dlaku na cetiri dijela-drugo sto cu da kazem je da se malo previse koristi ta analogija "sahovske table", "piona" i "velikih igraca" koji ih povlace i zrtvuju. Kriza u Ukrajini je pitanje Ukrajine i Rusije isto koliko je pitanje Zapada i Rusije, cak vjerovatno i vise. Iz prostog razloga sto Rusija Zapadu nije "dostojan" protivnik niti to moze biti u narednih minimum 30 godina. Putin i te kako dobro zna da bi bilo kakav prolongirani konflikt sa Zapadom izgubio u roku od najvise godinu dana-jer nema bukvalno nista cime se moze suprotstaviti produzenom ekonomskom pritisku i diplomatskoj izolaciji Zapada ukoliko do toga dodje. Ono na sta Putin racuna je neaktivnost Zapada, izazvana prosto cinjenicom da bi odlucnu akciju Zapad, a posebno neke EU zemlje, morale platiti novcem sto im se bas i ne radi. Znam da se po Internetu, cak i od nekih, ajde da ih tako nazovemo, ozbiljnijih analiticara (i Angele Merkel
Sa druge strane, Rusija nema "globalni" domet ali medju "komsijama" ima i te kako-i upravo tu je pogodno mjesto za konflikte od kojih se putinizam hrani i od kojih zivi. Sa druge strane, USA pod Obamom ima dugorocni trend i strategiju povlacenja sa evropske scene, a niti EU kao institucija, niti njene vodece drzave clanice nemaju ekspanzivne spoljnopoliticke ambicije. Da imaju-ne bi prijem novih clanica u EU trajao po 12 godina, na primjer
Nego, posto generalno na politickim topicima a i ovdje ljudi dosta imaju obicaj da se hvale, evo da i ja vala jednom to uradim, pa da kazem da isto prija sujeti kad bivsi americki drzavni sekretar i savjetnica za nacionalnu bezbjednost razmislja isto kao i ja
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinio...22c_story.html
Last edited by Recordare88; 09-03-14 at 09:45.
Deserve's got nothing to do with it.
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